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J. Hendrix McLane. Undated photograph.  
Source: McLane Papers, Yale University. 
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“The South has had its full share of illusions, fantasies, and 
pretensions, and it has continued to cling to some of them with an 
astonishing tenacity that defies explanation. But the illusion that 
‘history is something unpleasant that happens to other people’ is 
certainly not one of them…” 
 
C. Vann Woodward, 19601 
 
 
 
  
                                                
1 C. Vann Woodward, The Burden of Southern History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2008, orig. 
1960), 190. 
 [2] 
THE APOSTLE OF DISSENT: 
J. HENDRIX MCLANE’S FIGHT AGAINST HISTORY  
IN POST-RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH CAROLINA 
 
 
I. Introduction: Return of the Red-Shirts 
 
ON THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 24, 1882 in the small town of Winnsboro, South Carolina, 
40 miles north of Columbia, the state capital, the air was tinged with the smell of whiskey and 
charged the anticipation of violence. Hundreds of men, mounted on horseback and wearing red 
shirts, swarmed the town. Many brought banners; one man waved a rag-doll effigy in the air.2 
The cause of their agitation—and the man depicted in effigy—was a slender 32-year-old 
man with an uneven beard and a high-pitched voice.3 John Augustus Hendrix McLane, the 
Greenback-Labor Party’s candidate for governor, listened to the crowd’s jeering from inside 
Winnsboro’s only hotel. At noon, he took the hand of his ten-year-old daughter, left his room, and 
headed for the courthouse, where he was due to speak. He did not make it past the staircase’s 
landing. An apparently drunken man tore the collar of McLane’s shirt and kicked him. The 
candidate retreated into the hotel’s parlor room and barricaded himself and his daughter inside. 
They sat there for the better part of seven hours, interrupted only when a group of men broke down 
the door and lunged at McLane again.4 He became a prisoner, fearing for his life, in his adopted 
hometown. 
                                                
2 Charleston News and Courier, Sept. 26, 1882; New York Times, Oct. 7, 1882; [Washington, D.C.] National 
Republican, Oct. 7, 1882, Box 2, Folder 33, John Augustus Hendrix McLane Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, 
Yale University Library. 
3 Fairfield News and Herald, Jan. 25, 1882. 
4 Charleston News and Courier, Sept. 26, 1882; New York Times, Oct. 7, 1882; [Washington, D.C.] National 
Republican, Oct. 7, 1882, Box 2, Folder 33, McLane Papers. 
 [3] 
J. Hendrix McLane soon retreated into obscurity. He lost the 1882 election in a landslide, 
garnering barely 20 percent of the vote.5 Why, then, did this untested, long-shot candidate provoke 
such a reaction? What did McLane say and stand for?  
The import of McLane’s doomed gubernatorial run is visible in the Winnsboro crowd. 
Alongside the hooting white men stood a “large number” of black men; McLane, who was white, 
attracted, and depended on, an interracial political coalition.6 That fact alone marked him as a 
radical. The effigy of McLane was “half black, half white,” according to a newspaper account; the 
candidate was a clear transgressor of racial boundaries.7 His campaign tested the strength of South 
Carolina’s racial solidarity.  
McLane envisioned a wholesale political revolution. He aimed to overthrow the politics of 
racial and sectional animosities, animated by raw memories of the Civil War, and replace it with 
a new political alignment organized around a class appeal.8 In the 1882 election, and for more than 
a decade after, McLane cultivated a coalition of the economically oppressed. In his idealized 
vision, working people of all races and regions would unite to dethrone the monopolies, bankers, 
and lawyers who composed the economic elite. These intrepid efforts are important evidence that, 
in one historian’s words, “the South is not and never has been a monolith.”9 The winding and 
                                                
5 Boston Journal, Nov. 12, 1887; Brookes Miles Barnes, “Southern Independents: South Carolina, 1882,” South 
Carolina Historical Magazine 96, No. 3 (Jul. 1995), 249. 
6 [Washington, D.C.] National Republican, Oct. 7, 1882, Box 2, Folder 33, McLane Papers. 
7 Charleston News and Courier, Sept. 26, 1882. See also William J. Cooper Jr., The Conservative Regime: South 
Carolina, 1877–1890 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 15. 
8 Lawrence Goodwyn argues that the Civil War exerted a long shadow over the political system, organizing the 
parties around “[s]ectional, religious, and racial loyalties and prejudices” as opposed to “economic interests.” Long 
after the War ended, most people “vot[ed] as they shot.” Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Moment: A Short 
History of the Agrarian Revolt in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 4, 5. 
 On the matter of sectionalism, K. Stephen Prince offers a reminder that “regional identifiers are contrived 
and relational, not fixed and absolute”; sectional classifications are a social and cultural construct. However, the 
people of the 1870s and 1880s perceived sectional differences as real and fixed. K. Stephen Prince, Stories of the 
South: Race and the Reconstruction of Southern Identity, 1865–1915 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2014), 5. 
9 Carl Degler, The Other South: Southern Dissenters in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 
2–3. 
 [4] 
daring, though failed political career of Hendrix McLane reflected the promise and peril of an 
interracial, populist challenge to the state’s all-powerful conservative Democratic regime. It was 
fundamentally about the possibility of dissent in the circumscribed politics of the post-
Reconstruction South. 
Such dissent almost always failed. Despite more than a decade of organizing, orating, 
fundraising, letter-writing, canvassing, and lobbying, McLane never won an election. The 
Democrats were unscathed. Historians have, understandably, followed the example of the crowd 
in Winnsboro, silencing McLane in the story of South Carolina politics. Scholars of Southern 
populist reform movements devote much of their focus to the Readjusters of Virginia, by far the 
most successful of such groups, and to similar campaigns in North Carolina, Georgia, and Texas.10 
South Carolina, by contrast, was the very heart of the “deep South,” the nexus of conservative 
backlash to Reconstruction; there were relatively few white Republicans in the state.11 With the 
exception of a small handful of scholarly articles, McLane has been relegated, quite literally, to a 
footnote of history.12  
Reviving McLane’s story elucidates the swirling currents of history and memory that 
shaped Southern politics in the Gilded Age, as seen on that riotous day in Winnsboro. The red-
                                                
10 On the Readjusters and the Populists, see Degler, The Other South, 264–371. On reform in North Carolina, see 
Deborah Beckel, Radical Reform: Interracial Politics in Post-Emancipation North Carolina (Charlottesville, VA: 
University of Virginia Press, 2011). For landmark studies of the “New South,” the post-Reconstruction period in 
Southern history, see C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877–1913 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1951, reissued 1971); and Edward Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life After Reconstruction 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). For a newer work of cultural history on the New South and its 
relationship with the North, see Prince, Stories of the South. For studies of the Southern Populist movement, closely 
related to the agrarian reform championed by McLane, see Goodwyn, The Populist Moment; and Robert McMath 
Jr., American Populism: A Social History, 1877–1898 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993). 
11 Degler, The Other South, 266–67. 
12 The scholarly works that I have located that mention McLane with any degree of substance are Stephen 
Kantrowitz, “Ben Tillman and Hendrix McLane, Agrarian Rebels: White Manhood, ‘The Farmers,’ and the Limits 
of Southern Populism,” Journal of Southern History 66, No. 3 (Aug. 2000): 497–524; Stephen Kantrowitz, Ben 
Tillman and the Reconstruction of White Supremacy (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2000); and Barnes, “Southern Independents.” Herbert J. Seligmann, a journalist, wrote an unpublished essay on 
McLane, who was Seligmann’s father-in-law. See Section VI below. 
 [5] 
shirted men self-consciously viewed their disdain for McLane in the context of their overthrow of 
federal Reconstruction in 1876, which culminated in the election of Wade Hampton, a Democrat 
and former Confederate general, as governor. The so-called “Redeemers” of 1876—bands of 
violent Democratic organizers—wore the same red-shirt uniform. It was their visual retort to the 
Northern “bloody shirt,” a rhetorical emblem of the Union’s triumph in the Civil War that 
Republicans invoked to advance their political priorities.13 The men in the mob wore historical 
grievances on their sleeves. In Winnsboro, the battle over the meaning and legacy of the Civil War 
almost cost McLane his life. 
Only six years prior, though, he was an “active and efficient” Red-Shirt himself.14 McLane 
was not a progressive “carpet-bagger” imported from the North; he hated the “carpet-baggers,” 
the Northerners who entered the state after the War and helped administer Reconstruction. He had 
been a member of the Ku Klux Klan. While McLane turned on the Democrats and the Klan in 
1878, two years into Hampton’s administration, he never denounced Redemption. Instead, it 
became his model for political change. In the whiskey-filled air of Winnsboro in 1882, the Red-
Shirts recreated their 1876 campaign to shout down McLane, a so-called radical Republican; yet 
McLane employed the same 1876 moment as a source of inspiration for his opposition movement. 
Underneath the fear and violence of McLane’s experience in Winnsboro, historical contradictions 
festered. 
• 
                                                
13 For McLane’s assessment of the Red-Shirts, see Fairfield News and Herald, Oct. 25, 1882. Ed Ayers wrote that 
Hampton “embodied the Democratic ideal of the citizen soldier determined to reclaim his homeland from 
interlopers.” On Southern Redemption, and South Carolina’s in particular, see Eric Foner, A Short History of 
Reconstruction, 1863–1877 (New York: HarperPerennial, 2014, orig. 1990), 240–41, 248; Ayers, Promise of the 
New South, 8.  
14 Fairfield News and Herald, Nov. 8, 1882. 
 [6] 
J. Hendrix McLane was a creature of the South—and proud of it. He was born in Catoosa 
County, Georgia in 1848, and two of his older brothers fought for the Confederacy in the Civil 
War. If he had been old enough, he surely would have done the same.15 His family’s roots were in 
South Carolina, and though McLane was not rich, his ancestors were slaveholders. He married at 
age 21 and moved to Arkansas, perhaps to flee prosecution for his Klan activities. He became a 
widower five years later and moved to his widowed aunt’s farm in Feasterville, South Carolina, in 
the same county in which, seven years later, he was mobbed in 1882. He identified as a farmer, 
though for most of his adult life he was a full-time organizer and politician.16 
Politically, McLane was mercurial, identifying, at various times, as a Greenbacker, an 
Independent, a Republican, a Reform Republican, and a Populist. Despite these diverse labels, 
McLane consistently championed what he called the “toiling masses.” McLane’s political 
volatility captures the South’s fractured political landscape and the inherent instability of being a 
dissenting figure in it. After three electoral losses between 1880 and 1884, he restarted his political 
life in Boston. He travelled between the North and South constantly, traversed seemingly the entire 
spectrum of political parties, and courted an interracial coalition, straddling the country’s deepest 
political, social, and cultural divides. He therefore personified many aspects of the “New South,” 
a post-War movement that envisioned an industrial, prosperous, and peaceful South reconciled 
with the North and free from the traumas of both the Civil War and Reconstruction.17 Seeing the 
                                                
15 See J. Hendrix McLane, “Reply to the Above,” Boston Transcript, May 9, 1888, Box 2, Folder 33, McLane 
Papers. 
16 New York Semi-Weekly Tribune, Apr. 25, 1890, Box 2, Folder 30, McLane Papers; McLane, “Reply to the 
Above,” Boston Transcript, May 9, 1888, Box 2, Folder 33, McLane Papers.  
17 The “New South” was, K. Stephen Prince argues, a story as much as anything else. Statistics measuring industrial 
growth and the proliferation of railroads were used as markers of the achievement of the New South—even if, 
ultimately, “the New South boosters failed to deliver the economic and industrial revolution they had prophesied.” 
The New South story, Prince asserts, was always more fiction than non-fiction. Prince, Stories of the South, 98–99. 
 In defining the “New South” as a rhetorical device, Prince helps to resolve a core question of “New South” 
historiography: whether the New South was genuinely “new." As James S. Humphreys notes, the “enduring 
trademark[]” of white supremacy survived the transition of the “Old” to the “New” South, and even now, “vestiges 
 [7] 
America of the 1880s and 1890s through McLane’s eyes reveals a man, a region, and a nation 
fraught with inner contradictions, struggling against history itself.  
History triumphed. McLane’s agenda of economic populism, electoral reform, and clean 
government failed to overcome racial and sectional tribalism in the South. He failed for many 
reasons. Most historians who have taken up the question of the defeat of Southern agrarian 
dissenters have blamed outcomes on the force of racism or the social constraints of “white 
manhood.”18 Yet McLane’s failures reveal the ways that historical memory functioned as a 
powerful, psychological force, encompassing racial and sectional animosities, to curtail the 
possibilities of Southern dissent. White racist appeals against McLane drew from symbols and 
stories of the past. The legacy of the Civil War and the memory of Reconstruction tainted white 
South Carolinians’ perceptions of all reform movements, breeding distrust, resentment, and 
violence. McLane, of course, was one such white Southerner; ghosts from his own past haunted 
his attempt to forge this radical coalition and to achieve the full possibilities of his vision. 
McLane did establish some degree of a biracial, cross-sectional political movement. But 
his ultimate failure to maintain this coalition, attract the support of the North, and create a viable 
statewide threat to Democratic rule illustrates how appeals to the War and Reconstruction impeded 
economic and civil-rights reforms and entrenched white supremacy. The story of McLane’s 
circuitous career is a story of racial and regional solidarity trumping the economic interests of poor 
                                                
of the Old South remain.” For Humphreys’s historiographical study of the “New South” concept and a variety of 
perspectives on the topic, see James S. Humphreys, ed., The New South (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 
2018). See also Ayers, Promise of the New South, 20–21. 
18 Stephen Kantrowitz explains McLane’s losses—and the success of agrarian rabble-rouser Benjamin Tillman (see 
below, Sections IV and V)—with the notion of white male producerism, the first assumption of which was that 
“only white male producers were entitled to govern.” This fundamentally limited the potential of a dissenting, 
interracial coalition. Carl Degler, whose work does not cover McLane, makes the straightforward claim that the 
story of Southern dissent is the story of racial allegiances trumping class allegiances. Kantrowitz, Ben Tillman, 109; 
Kantrowitz, “Agrarian Rebels,” 497–98, 502; Degler, The Other South, 7, 357. See also McMath, American 
Populism, 171–73. 
 [8] 
Southerners through the conduit of historical memory. It demonstrates, more broadly, historical 
memory’s power as a political weapon, with tales of the past constraining ideologies of the present 
and visions of the future. 
 
II. Awake, Awake, Awake, Brother Farmers!: Agrarian Revolts, 1876–1879 
FIVE DAYS BEFORE HIS THIRTEENTH BIRTHDAY, J. Hendrix McLane bade one of his older 
brothers farewell. E. R. McLane joined the First Confederate Regiment Georgia Volunteers on 
March 18, 1861, nearly a month before shots at Fort Sumter started the Civil War. Three years 
later, he was dead.19 The War eventually took another of McLane’s brothers and two of his 
brothers-in-law.20 McLane almost never discussed or wrote about his family publicly, but he could 
not escape the long shadow of the conflict. When he came of age, McLane joined the successful 
1876 effort of white Democrats to dethrone Reconstruction—and to truly end, in many ways, the 
Civil War. As McLane developed political consciousness and then broke off from his former 
comrades, he continued to frame his ideas with reference to 1876. Paradoxically, McLane 
cultivated a new movement that self-consciously disregarded the legacies of history, yet grew out 
of his own roots in the past. 
McLane’s earliest political ideas reflected his Confederate upbringing: he condemned 
Reconstruction as corrupt and depraved. McLane denounced “carpet-bag rule” and harbored 
hatred for the Northerners who entered the state during those years: “To say that all the Northern 
people who came to the State were unworthy would be unjust,” he wrote in 1888, “but those who 
                                                
19 Obituary of E. R. McLane, March 18, 1868, Box 1, Folder 16, McLane Papers. 
20 Boston Journal, Nov. 12, 1887; J. Hendrix McLane, “Reply to the Above,” Boston Transcript, May 9, 1888, Box 
2, Folder 33, McLane Papers. 
 [9] 
were not constituted the exception instead of the rule.”21 The carpet-baggers, he said in an 1883 
interview, were “political adventurers” who made insincere alliances with blacks in order to 
“secure[] offices for themselves, and [run] the State Government for their own benefit, to the injury 
of both the white and colored taxpayers of the State.”22 McLane’s was a typical Southern view of 
Reconstruction. In reality, corruption was no more common among carpet-baggers than among 
homegrown politicians. As historian Carl Degler notes, the carpet-baggers never constituted a 
large enough part of the population to exert political influence.23 Nevertheless, the bugaboo of 
corruption became an extremely important element in McLane’s later organizing efforts. The 
young firebrand also blamed the Reconstruction regime for racial violence, arguing that the carpet-
baggers “engendered and fostered prejudice between the two races until the whites felt it necessity 
to organize for protection” in the form of the Ku Klux Klan.24 Whites’ murderous attacks, in his 
view, were primarily defensive and a product of the North’s interference.  
McLane exaggerated the role of the carpet-baggers, but the heightened political power of 
blacks in the South, particularly in South Carolina, was no myth. During Reconstruction, black 
officeholders held a majority in the state legislature. They passed new taxes on large landowners 
and used state money to provide land to settlers, typically freedmen, at low prices.25 Reflecting the 
standard view of white Southerners, infected by racial prejudices and wary of the dramatic changes 
of the period, McLane remembered Reconstruction as a dark period in Southern history. 
                                                
21 J. Hendrix McLane, “A Southern Independent Movement,” Boston Transcript, n.d. [1888], Essay I, Box 2, Folder 
33, McLane Papers. 
22 Philadelphia Press, Feb. 13, 1883, Box 2, Folder 33, McLane Papers. 
23 Degler, The Other South, 194. Between 1872 and 1877, perceptions of Northern politicians in the South 
transformed dramatically, coalescing around the common view of “carpet-baggers” as “scheming vagabonds and 
impecunious swindlers” held by large swaths of the population even today. The negative notion of “carpet-baggers” 
was a construction, not a universally established fact. Prince, Stories of the South, 80–81, 93. 
24 Philadelphia Press, Feb. 13, 1883, Box 2, Folder 33, McLane Papers. 
25 Barnes, “Southern Independents,” 231; Heather Cox Richardson, To Make Men Free: A History of the Republican 
Party (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 92–93. 
 [10] 
These ideas drove McLane into the political arena for the first time through his involvement 
with the Ku Klux Klan and the “straightout” movement. The nature of McLane’s connection with 
the Klan and the Red-Shirts was highly disputed. The only accounts of those periods come from 
recollections many years later from McLane himself and his political opponents—all with partisan 
agendas. When directly challenged in 1888, McLane admitted to having been a member of the 
Klan, but he framed it as a respectable self-defense group that was later infiltrated by “reckless 
and unsafe characters.”26 However, in an 1882 interview with a Greenback Party paper, McLane 
flatly denied participating in Red-Shirt activities.27 Meanwhile, opponents made lurid accusations 
about both affiliations. One newspaper claimed that Democratic leaders struggled to “restrain[] 
him from attacking the poor colored men”; another quoted McLane in 1876 saying “that the time 
had come for negro head-breaking at election.”28 Regardless, in identifying as a straightout, 
McLane staked his opposition to Reconstruction as a member of an avowedly white supremacist 
group. The movement, according to its own platform, “demand[ed] [that] the principle of white 
supremacy shall be considered one of the fundamental principles” of the Democratic Party.29 
McLane’s political life began on racially fraught terrain, toppling the Reconstruction government 
elected by, and in part run by, freedmen. 
Soon, however, McLane split from the administration he helped install. After “the great 
struggle of 1876,” McLane wrote in 1888, the white farmers who championed Hampton began to 
realize “that their costly efforts” had not yielded an “‘honest government,’ [or] a ‘people’s 
                                                
26 McLane, “Reply to the Above,” Boston Transcript, May 9, 1888, Box 2, Folder 33, McLane Papers.  
27 Fairfield News and Herald, Oct. 25, 1882. 
28 [Sumter] Watchman and Southron, Oct. 3, 1882; R. Means Davis, “A Southern Independent at Bay,” Boston 
Transcript, May 9, 1888, Box 2, Folder 33, McLane Papers. 
29 “The Philosophy of Straightout Democracy,” Abbeville Medium, n.d., Fitz William McMaster Papers, Scrapbook, 
South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina. 
 [11] 
government,’ […] but in fact a ring government—a purely class government.”30 The imperative 
of racial solidarity during Reconstruction repressed, but did not eliminate, class tensions among 
the whites. Disaffection was, according to historian C. Vann Woodward, “unnaturally bottled up 
for a generation”; it soon bubbled over as independent movements across the South gained 
stature.31  
The first sign of the Redeemer government’s betrayal of the people, according to McLane, 
was the “phosphate law,” which granted three companies exclusive rights to the state’s phosphate 
beds, on which farmers relied for fertilizers. In limiting competition, McLane claimed, the law 
produced “extortionate prices.” In McLane’s view, the fertilizers “belong to the State” as a 
collective resource, not as the domain of private companies.32 As he championed farmers’ 
interests, McLane challenged unrestricted capitalism. The fertilizer trouble was only one element 
of what one scholar called a “seemingly intractable crisis of the agricultural economy”; the farmers 
were seriously struggling as the currency contracted and prices plunged.33 Meanwhile, the “direct 
beneficiaries” of the phosphate law, McLane raged, were the “lawyers about Charleston”—the 
same lawyers who controlled the legislature.34 McLane’s ire was explicitly antagonistic and class-
conscious. This was not the “honest government” promised by Redemption but self-interested 
“class government.” McLane’s rhetoric pitted the “agriculturalists” against the “lawyers,” 
perceiving the conflict in purely economic terms. 
                                                
30 J. Hendrix McLane, “Southern Independence,” Boston Transcript, n.d. [1888], Essay VI, Box 2, Folder 33, 
McLane Papers. 
31 Woodward, Origins of the New South, 76. 
32 J. Hendrix McLane, “Southern Independence,” Boston Transcript, n.d. [1888], Essay V, Box 2, Folder 33, 
McLane Papers. 
33 Kantrowitz, Ben Tillman, 98. Upcountry farmers faced a perfect storm of economic woes stemming from debt, 
lien, and tenancy; credit was short, railroad rates were high, and fertilizer was expensive. Meanwhile, a glut of 
cotton drove down prices. Barnes, “Southern Independents,” 235; Cooper, The Conservative Regime, 141–42; 
Goodwyn, The Populist Moment, 12; Ayers, Promise of the New South, 14.  
34 J. Hendrix McLane, “Southern Independence,” Boston Transcript, n.d. [1888], Essay VI, Box 2, Folder 33, 
McLane Papers. See also Woodward, Origins of the New South, 80. 
 [12] 
During the summer of 1878, McLane grew increasingly agitated about the power and 
abuses of the “lawyers.” Although in April he signed a resolution that “earnestly endorse[d] the 
administration of Governor Wade Hampton,” by June, he published a resolution of his local 
Democratic club refusing to endorse “the election of any of the legal profession to the 
Legislature.”35 While lawyers were to administer the laws, the “farmer, together with the Mechanic 
and Merchant,” had “the right to make the laws.”36 Class solidarity was the organizing axis of 
McLane’s politics. By July 1878, he heightened his rhetoric even more. In the same newspaper, 
he urged “the people of Feasterville, in this farmers movement, to shake off the shackles of 
oppression riveted on them, by pernicious legislation, and to revolt at the virulent influence of the 
heinous practice of litigation, which together are crushing us.” Posing as a prophet of liberation, 
he wished to “raise [his] voice like a trumpet of thunder” and “cry out, and say, AWAKE, 
AWAKE, AWAKE, brother farmers to know your appalling condition.”37 The farming masses 
were crippled by high prices, debt, and “litigation” to the point of enslavement. He invoked slavery 
as purely economic oppression. McLane pledged to make known to the farmers their vulnerable 
position and to resist the lawyers’ domination. 
This agrarian economic appeal became the basis of McLane’s dissenting ideology. One 
month after his fiery letter, McLane and 12 other farmers in Feasterville set up an “Independent 
club.” All were white Democrats; they held meetings and in 1879 tapped McLane to start “agitating 
and organizing” full time.38 His first major address came in Feasterville, where he was still living 
with his brother and aunt. Now, his enemies were not just the lawyers in Charleston but the bankers 
                                                
35 Fairfield News and Herald, Apr. 2, 1878; Fairfield News and Herald, Jun. 6, 1878. 
36 Fairfield News and Herald, Jun. 6, 1878. McLane served as the secretary of the Feasterville Democratic Party. 
37 Fairfield News and Herald, Jul. 9, 1878. 
38 J. Hendrix McLane, “Southern Independence,” Boston Transcript, n.d. [1888], Essay VI, Box 2, Folder 33, 
McLane Papers. 
 [13] 
and railroad tycoons in New York. He identified with “the common people” and condemned the 
government for bending to the “interests of railroad companies, money lords, and national bankers, 
who are fast molding liberty’s palladium into a prostitute machine, which they mean to operate in 
oppressing the laboring people of this land.”39 The source of political imbalance, in McLane’s 
mind, was purely economic: the rich oppressed the poor. To uphold the interests of the laboring 
people, McLane endorsed the burgeoning Greenback movement. Whereas the banking and lending 
class favored hard money, the Greenbackers supported an inflationary paper currency, such as the 
green-tinted paper money that proved so important to financing the Union’s War effort, that would 
ease farmers’ debts and increase laborers’ wages.40 Economic issues dominated McLane’s 
Greenback program. 
Meanwhile, he gave only passing mention to the question of race, indicating his desire to 
move beyond the tensions that defined the Reconstruction and Redemption eras. The Greenback 
Party, he noted at the outset, welcomed “all good and honest men everywhere, regardless of race, 
                                                
39 J. Hendrix McLane, “Labor and Finance: Address to the People of South Carolina,” Nov. 30, 1879, 1–2, Box 2, 
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creed or past political affiliation.”41 McLane used the rhetoric of slavery to stress economic unity, 
not racial division; the capitalist class, he contended, understood that “to enslave us only meant to 
keep us ignorant, and to keep us ignorant was to make and keep us poor.” The working people, 
deprived of economic power, became subject to the will of the “money-changers.”42 In McLane’s 
rendering, the bloody realities of race-based human bondage dissolved into metaphor; in its place 
was a color-blind articulation of the vast inequalities of the Gilded Age economy.43 In one sense, 
this suppression of race ignored its prominence in South Carolina politics and neglected the 
debilitating effects of slavery and racism on African Americans. Yet it also rejected explicit white 
supremacist rhetoric. As the state’s agricultural malaise continued, poor whites grew even more 
anxious about their status and took comfort in their perceived social superiority to their similarly 
vulnerable black neighbors.44 For McLane, adopting a color-blind platform meant denying white 
farmers such racist assurances. The “Labor and Finance” speech vaulted class concerns ahead of 
racial hierarchies and seemed to embrace people of all races who shared McLane’s resentment 
against the wealthy. 
In muting the race issue, McLane sought to move politics to a different register, leaving 
behind the divisions and emotions of the past. He sharply criticized the “money monopoly” in 
Congress for “flaunting the ‘bloody shirt,’ digging up the dead past and quarreling over sectional 
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issues.”45 The sectional animosities of the Civil War era were, to McLane, part of “the dead past,” 
irrelevant to politics nearly 15 years after Appomattox. Bickering about the Civil War was a 
distraction from the farmers’ pressing economic concerns. McLane celebrated the “honest 
element” of Republicans who were setting aside history and fleeing to the third-party movement. 
Such men, McLane said, “beg us of the South to not notice any more of the bloody-shirt speeches 
of the Democrat and Republican leaders, but forget the past, with all its sectionalism, and join 
them in the holy work of driving bad men out of office.”46  
Sectionalism was still a major factor organizing the political landscape, as is evident from 
McLane’s own language: he drew distinctions between the Republicans of the North and “us of 
the South.” But the dream of the Greenback Party was to let such sectionalism wither. The 
Greenbackers would unite the sections and “forget the past.” When leaders invoked the Civil War 
through “bloody-shirt” rhetoric, alluding to the Union’s sacrifices, they perpetuated the unjust 
political and economic order of the present. In McLane’s understanding, history prevented natural 
allies of workers and farmers, North and South, black and white, from coming together to defeat 
the “money power,” their common opponent. McLane’s endorsement of the Greenbackers 
expressed a yearning to cast off the acrimonious past for a future free from divisions. 
But the model for this economic revolution originated in McLane’s past; he viewed the 
Greenback movement in 1879 as a second Redemption. His rhetoric explicitly channeled this 
concept, seeking to “redeem labor from the rigors of the money power.”47 He castigated Charleston 
lawyers for promoting self-serving legislation in the same way that he chastised office-seeking 
carpet-baggers of Reconstruction. McLane never apologized for “the memorable campaign of 
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1876.” “On the contrary,” he wrote in 1890, “I am proud to think that I had some hand in helping 
drive from power the band of carpet-bag harpies that were plundering the state from end to end.”48 
Hatred of dishonest government, rooted in his experience of Reconstruction, was core to his 
politics and his psyche. And by 1878, he aimed to mobilize those feelings to motivate a political 
and economic realignment. He sought to cast aside the racial divisions of Reconstruction—the 
subject of the 1876 revolt—to overthrow the economic elite. Historical memory was therefore both 
his obstacle and his inspiration. As the election of 1880 approached, J. Hendrix McLane intended 
to redeem South Carolina and the masses of farmers from their own history. 
 
III. A Regular Old ’76 Time: McLane on the Ballot, 1880–84 
IN DECEMBER 1882, a fire began on the second floor of J. S. Wiley’s store in Columbia. 
The flames engulfed the headquarters of the Reform Signal, the independent newspaper that J. 
Hendrix McLane had managed and helped fund for the previous year. By the time the fire subsided, 
it caused $50,000 worth of damages.49 It punctuated a dispiriting year for McLane with a final, 
incendiary indignity. He was one month removed from a grueling gubernatorial campaign that 
ended in a landslide defeat.50 He was only two years removed from an even more decisive loss as 
a Greenback candidate for a congressional seat in which he registered almost no support.51 Two 
years after the fire, he withdrew from a congressional bid before any ballots were cast. Between 
1880 and 1884, McLane was constantly a candidate, travelling from local meeting to local meeting, 
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organizing new political clubs, writing articles, and giving interviews. The inescapable reality of 
his electoral career—and that of most Southern dissenters—was loss. The white voters he courted 
grappled with loss, too: the Confederacy’s defeat continued to define South Carolina’s political 
climate. The Democratic press’s responses to McLane indicated that the memory of the War and 
Reconstruction shaped South Carolinians’ view of the dissident. McLane’s electoral efforts 
illustrate a series of failed attempts to cross the sharp lines that Reconstruction etched into politics. 
Even McLane, though, could not help but root his Independent program in the same history that 
he attempted to transcend. 
In 1882, McLane recognized that any chance of victory depended on broadening his 
coalition to Republicans, so he softened, to some degree, his fiery populist message. McLane 
blamed his congressional debacle in 1880 on the presence of a Republican candidate in the race, 
who performed much better.52 In January 1882, McLane made efforts to coordinate with black 
Republican leaders; this paid off in September, when the state Republican Party endorsed McLane 
for governor.53 This “fusion” of the parties occurred even as the Republicans refused to endorse 
the Greenback Party’s economic platform. The party’s official resolution “repudiat[ed] the 
financial principles advocated by the Greenback Party and reaffirm[ed] the principles of the Union 
Republican Party,” hedging its endorsement but reaffirming its support for “a free ballot and a fair 
                                                
52 J. Hendrix McLane, “Southern Independence,” Boston Transcript, n.d. [1888], Essay VII, Box 2, Folder 33, 
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count.”54 McLane’s first barrier to overcome was the basic ideological and economic gulf dividing 
those who hated the Democrats.  
In the two months between the Republicans’ endorsement of McLane and election day, the 
candidate accentuated the theme of electoral process and muted his class-conscious rhetoric. In 
interviews, McLane defined the election in terms of broad, small-r republican principles: “We are 
now in the midst of a political revolution,” he said, “and the issue is, freedom of speech and purity 
of the ballot.”55 He raged against the “eight-box law” of 1882, which complicated election 
procedures by requiring ballots for different offices to be placed into the correctly labeled box. 
The law implemented a de facto literacy test, disfranchising most black voters as well as poor 
whites—precisely McLane’s base of support.56 In the 1880s, turnout plummeted to about 40 
percent.57 Four of the Greenbacks’ 18 planks on their platform dealt with electoral fairness, 
including a condemnation of Democratic attempts to “disfranchise many thousands of voters of 
both races.”58 The economic differences between the parties, however, kept the dissenters from 
uniting around issues as powerful and motivating as those that drove the Readjusters of Virginia, 
namely support for refinancing the state debt and expanding public education. Hatred of the 
Democrats and electoral pragmatism drove the alliance more than deep-rooted ideology.59 
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McLane incorporated arguments about republican government and fair elections into his 
overarching effort to transcend historical racial barriers. He envisioned a fundamental realignment 
of politics in 1882: “In State politics the contest this year will not be as formerly, between white 
people and the colored people, but it will be between […] the Progressive and the non-Progressive 
elements of the country.” The “Progressives” were enlightened liberals, basing their votes on “truth 
and argument” rather than power and self-interest, and would “contend for the right of free speech 
and honesty at the ballot-box.” The question of honest elections, McLane argued, would bury the 
racial divisions of the past. “Between the Democratic and Republican parties there is no living 
issue,” he added. The “old parties,” he added, were both instruments of tyranny.60  
                                                
importantly, fusion with the Republicans made voting for the Greenback ticket impossible for most loyal Democrats. 
Cooper, The Conservative Regime, 71.  
60 Fairfield News and Herald, Jan. 25, 1882.  
A cartoon of McLane in an 1882 newspaper. 
Source: McLane Papers, Yale University. 
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McLane yearned to wipe the political slate clean of its racially fraught history. In the 
Charleston Independent—a campaign organ McLane helped start in 1884 to promote the 
Republican presidential candidate—an editorial extended this criticism of backwards-looking 
politics. The unsigned article traced South Carolina’s stagnation to its basis of government on the 
“race spirit.” “For the eight years from 1868 to 1876 our government was based upon the colored 
vote,” the editorial argued, and “since 1876 it has been based upon the white count,” an “unhealthy 
condition of things” that produced “incalculable disadvantages.”61 Racially segregated politics was 
a problem of the past. The article endorsed some degree of integration in order to achieve progress; 
the Independents—the party label McLane used in 1884—sought a new, color-blind alignment. 
The Independents did not believe that racialized politics were inevitable or intrinsic, but rooted in 
habit and history.  
McLane’s campaigns sought to shift politics away from this racial alignment through a 
new spirit of “liberality,” as embodied by “[f]ree speech, honest voting and good schools.”62 
History was imprisoning the state. The Charleston Independent editorial referenced the influence 
of the Civil War and sought to reconcile the two sides in two glib sentences: “We cheerfully 
acknowledge the supremacy of the national government and at the same time we expect to uphold 
the rights of States. We are persuaded, however, that the sooner we break loose from the moorings 
of the past and enter upon a course of broad and national views, […] the better it will be for every 
department of our interest.”63 This “cheerful” view brushed aside lingering hostilities of the War 
and embraced sectional reunion. If the wounds of the War and Reconstruction remained raw, there 
would be no way for the Independents to attract a biracial coalition and divide the white electorate. 
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When McLane called for a new “progressive” movement, he used that term literally, framing his 
politics as forward-looking, free from the influences and impositions of history.  
Particularly in 1882, McLane cultivated some degree of an interracial movement in 
opposition to the Democrats, and the racialized backlash he faced testifies to the legitimate threat 
he posed to the Democrats’ control of the state. At a Lexington County meeting in September, 
McLane spoke before ten white Greenbackers and 40 black Republicans in addition to about 200 
Democrats; at a speech in Kershaw, “two or three hundred colored men” formed the vast bulk of 
McLane’s crowd; 300 black people and 50 whites gathered in the Yorkville court house to hear 
the candidate speak in October.64 Attracting serious numbers of black voters was his only 
reasonable path to winning office in a majority-black state.65 White Independents sometimes made 
explicit appeals to black voters. One “Washington Correspondent” took out a column in the 
Charleston Independent in 1884 to praise the “black man whose muscle has been as meat and 
clothing to [South Carolina’s] people” and urge “these honest and industrious, though much 
abused foster brothers to now come to the front to reclaim the state.”66 The Independents’ 
interracial coalition was never egalitarian; racial paternalism suffused the movement. South 
Carolina’s blacks were only “foster brothers” to the whites. The writer’s praise of black “muscle” 
was little more than a euphemistic expression of gratitude for the previously forced labor of 
slavery. Nevertheless, the article illustrates the political leverage freedmen held: without their 
votes, the efforts of the Independents were worthless. McLane’s sincere attempt to divide the white 
vote caused considerable alarm among conservative Democrats, or the “Bourbons.”67 Numerous 
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Democratic newspapers printed accounts of McLane’s allegedly virulent racism while a member 
of the Ku Klux Klan and the “red-shirt Democracy,” seeking to discredit him in the eyes of black 
voters.68 McLane’s allies and opponents alike understood that the fate of the Independents hinged 
on their ability to recruit black Republicans and simultaneously dodge the Democrats’ race-baiting 
missives. 
But even as McLane staked his campaigns on a view that rejected the racial divisions of 
the past, he continued to frame the Independent movement in the language and memory of 
Redemption. At the Greenback State Convention in 1882, the committee based its platform on the 
Democrats’ platform of 1876—the creed that overthrew federal Reconstruction. The Greenback 
Convention took the Hampton campaign’s promises of color-blind administration of the law at 
face value. The first plank of the Greenback platform was a lament about the “violation of the most 
solemn pledges made to the people in 1876 by the leaders under Hampton.”69 As historian Stephen 
Kantrowitz notes, most of the Greenbackers shared a “common history as white Democrats”; their 
claims as “legitimate inheritor[s] of the Redemption legacy” were a natural outgrowth of their 
personal involvement in the events of 1876.70 The key to developing an interracial voting bloc 
appeared to be to maintain the promises and rhetoric of Redemption—to restore a revolution, rather 
than to forge a new one.  
When McLane was nominated for governor, he further tried to claim the mantle of 
Redemption. After “vociferous applause” and “[l]oud calls,” McLane defiantly addressed the 
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group of between 120 and 150 delegates, a quarter of whom were black: “If you stand by me and 
follow me through I will be Governor of South Carolina, or by the Eternal, we will have a military 
government.”71 This ominous and confusing line provoked outrage and mockery in the Democratic 
press.72 But McLane claimed that the stark warning came directly from the words of the 
Democrats’ vaunted leader of Redemption: he explained a month later “that I simply quoted the 
remark of Wade Hampton, made in 1875,” hoping to convey his complete devotion to the 
campaign.73 The newly anointed Greenback nominee pinned his candidacy to the words of Wade 
Hampton; he did not run from the past. Redemption was a fitting model for McLane’s movement: 
in 1882, he ran against corruption and disorder and appealed for an end to racialized, divisive 
politics—just as the Redeemers had. The legacy of 1876 resonated emotionally with white 
conservatives and moderates yet allowed McLane to revive its civil-rights promises, however 
hollow and paternalistic they were. This self-avowed “progressive” sought to couch his candidacy 
in the memory and words of Redemption. 
McLane made one of his most direct appeals to 1876 in a statement published in the 
Charleston Independent in September 1884, when he was still running for Charleston’s 
congressional seat. (He withdrew in October.74) “In the memorable year of 1876,” he wrote, the 
state’s “gray haired fathers” mobilized to elect Hampton “with the promise that all people, white 
and colored, rich and poor, should be equal before the law.” It was an understatement for McLane 
to say this promise “had been grossly violated.”75 The radical shift that he attempted to bring about 
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in South Carolina politics—to move beyond the racial categories that defined the parties—was, he 
claimed, actually the promise of Redemption itself. In the article, McLane endorsed the Republican 
presidential candidate in 1884, James Blaine.76 Perhaps there is no better example of his precarious 
position in history: he referenced the campaign of 1876 to rally former Democrats to an 
Independent movement—and he urged them, without irony, to vote with the Republicans and 
transcend that very history.  
This gamble backfired. Opponents mobilized against McLane using the memory of 
Redemption. McLane’s 1882 candidacy, the Camden Journal charged, attempted “to resuscitate 
and bring to life the putrified [sic] issues of a dead past.”77 In tying McLane to the past, opponents 
racialized him and condemned him as an opponent of white supremacy. The Democratic press 
painted the largely white Greenback movement as part of the “broad black shadow cast by South 
Carolina Radicalism”—in other words, the black-dominated Republican Party. “In fighting the 
Greenback candidates,” the Charleston News and Courier echoed, “we are fighting the party which 
we defeated in 1876. It is the white man, with his colored allies, against black ignorance and white 
corruption as it was six years ago.”78 The News and Courier thus saw 1882 as a reprise of 1876, 
too. In its view, McLane’s group was “corrupt,” and the true meaning of Redemption was not a 
color-blind notion of equal rights but a campaign against “black ignorance” and an effort to 
maintain white supremacy. Similarly, Sumter’s Watchman and Southron published a short notice 
from “Uncle Dick” in colloquial dialect:  
It is going to be a pretty stiffish fight too—the black-faces and green-backs will be solid, 
but bless yer boys, “We’ve done it before, and we’ll do it again […].” Go in boys—we aint 
got the words bolter or independent in our County dickshinary—stick together, talk over 
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as many niggers as you can, and vote early and often on election day, and let’s hear no 
more chat of independent tickets.79  
 
Beyond baldly urging election fraud, “Uncle Dick” reminded the “boys” that they had 
“done it before”: they had overthrown “black-faces” in 1876. Absolute racial and party solidarity 
still appeared to reign in Sumter, enforced through reminders about Reconstruction and 
Redemption. A somewhat more eloquent writer made the same claim in a Union, South Carolina 
newspaper. “We must have a rousing time up here—a regular old ’76 time—to rouse us up,” the 
newspaper editorialized. “We must equal, if not exceed the memorable ’76 campaign.”80 The press 
drummed up energy around the Democratic standard through nostalgic appeals to 1876. That 
McLane himself was a proud Redeemer—even in 1882—readers would never have known.81  
The Democratic candidate for governor, Hugh S. Thompson, likewise portrayed McLane 
as a threat to Redemption. In Winnsboro, where McLane was mobbed a week later, Thompson 
spoke bluntly: “To vote for the Greenback ticket is to vote for the restoration of the Radical party 
to power.”82 Thompson effaced the difference between Republicans and Greenbackers, carpet-
baggers and homegrown dissenters, past and present; opposing the Democratic Party meant being 
a “Radical” outsider. He reiterated that “[i]t was settled in 1876 that none but Carolinians shall 
rule Carolina. We intend to maintain home-rule and honest government.”83 Even though McLane 
himself was, by ancestry, a “Carolinian,” he was treated as an outsider and carpet-bagger. His 
candidacy became a referendum on Redemption. “[A]ll that was gained in the struggle of Seventy-
six is at stake in the present issue,” the Fairfield News and Herald declared.84  
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Even white supporters of the Independents subscribed to the racialized view of 
Reconstruction propounded by such accounts. One letter-writer to the Charleston Independent in 
1884 cheered the “bold and fearless Independents” but added that “we don’t want Negro Rule. 
Great God, Mr. Editor, I would just as soon have Negro Radical Rule as the so-called Democratic 
Double-Radical Rule that now exists in South Carolina.”85 The specter of “Negro Radical Rule”—
a synonym for Reconstruction—haunted the Independents from all directions. Though 
Redemption seemed to chase away that ghost, it returned to thwart McLane’s efforts to make 
inroads with white farmers in the mid-1880s.  
Beyond rhetoric, the mobilization along the lines of 1876 also produced the same race-
driven violence of the earlier period. McLane was not the only Independent who was mobbed; L. 
W. R. Blair, the Greenback candidate for governor in 1880, was assassinated in July 1882 “for the 
purpose of intimidating our people,” McLane later recalled.86 In an 1882 interview with the New 
York Times, McLane similarly said that Democrats “do not hesitate to shoot down negroes on the 
slightest provocation, and it is their policy to work up a race feeling.”87 One such racial clash 
occurred in Lancaster in late September, where, according to McLane, Democrats shot into a 
crowd of black men and killed “[s]everal of them.” He blamed his loss in 1882 on this “fraud” and 
“force of bullets.”88 In 1882, McLane lost by a margin of nearly 60 percent; intimidation alone did 
not cost him the election. He won a lone county, a lowcountry, heavily black, Republican 
stronghold, though he registered moderate success in some majority-white counties.89 What is 
clear, though, is that South Carolina in 1882 or 1884 had not moved beyond the racial battles that 
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characterized the backlash to Reconstruction from the moment it began. That history, in which 
McLane, of course, was implicated, proved too much for him to overcome, no matter how 
progressive his vision.  
 
IV. This Mutual Cooperation: Crossing the Sectional Boundary, 1886–88 
AFTER HIS DEMORALIZING ELECTORAL FAILURES IN 1882 AND 1884, Hendrix McLane had 
little to show for his exhausting and physically dangerous mission of loosening the Democrats’ 
grip on South Carolina’s politics. The latter election sidelined the 36-year-old to his bed; he 
“became ill from overwork” at the end of the 1884 campaign and was “under constant medical 
care” through the winter, according to an essay he wrote in 1888.90 The illness may have been 
mental as much as physical; an 1888 newspaper reported that he suffered “a serious nervous 
prostration.”91 Yet if 1885 marked the nadir of McLane’s disappointing public life, 1886 began 
perhaps its most promising period. Though McLane left his state for Boston to attend divinity 
school, he heightened his efforts to realign South Carolina politics in a more populist and 
progressive direction. In the North, this former Confederate partisan seemed to attract more 
support than he ever did in his home state. As McLane established new political and personal 
connections, he began to live the reality of his program of a politics freed from the sectional 
barriers of the Civil War. In short, McLane became an unlikely symbol and advocate of sectional 
reconciliation. The uneducated farmer-turned-member-of-the-Boston-elite ultimately left town 
with new allies, a new wife, and a refined message—but he could never, even then, escape the 
burdens imposed by the past. 
                                                
90 J. Hendrix McLane, “Reply to the Above,” Boston Transcript, May 9, 1888, Box 2, Folder 23, McLane Papers. 
91 “A South Carolina Symposium,” Boston Transcript, [n.d.] 1888, Box 2, Folder 33, McLane Papers. See also 
Abbeville Messenger, Jul. 20, 1886. 
 [28] 
 Before leaving for Boston, McLane made a final speech in Feasterville that signaled his 
continued political ambitions and his desire to transcend the political constraints of the Civil War. 
McLane organized his address, delivered at the local Grange, around contrasts between suffering 
and renewal, the Old and New South. The speech began with visceral imagery of the War. “A 
stream of human blood was poured out and mingled with the soil,” McLane recalled, “as if vying 
with the crystal limpid fountains that gushed forth from the base of those historic hills.” The 
“whole earth seemed to tremble,” “culminat[ing]” in the “terrible conflagration” in Atlanta.92 
McLane’s language pulsed with the anguish and terror of the War as if it had ended moments, and 
not two decades, before. But he pivoted to “more pleasant thoughts,” namely, Atlanta’s speedy 
revival. He celebrated the proliferation of railroads, bridges, and telegraph lines and attributed the 
city’s newfound prosperity to “Northern money and Northern enterprise.” He cheered the 
intermarriage between Northerners and Southerners. McLane’s language about the North’s hand 
in the rebuilding of Atlanta was remarkably rosy—especially for someone who had just reminded 
his listeners that “union bayonets” had unjustly forced “[o]ld men and old women” into prisons. 
In the flourishing New South, the tensions of the War dissolved. Atlanta, McLane rejoiced, “sprang 
from its ashes like a mushroom in the night.”93 His shift in tone was jarring, emphasizing the 
possibility of the South remaking itself and the allure of rapid, radical change. 
Yet South Carolina, McLane said, had never regenerated; he blamed his state’s poverty on 
its rulers’ failure to accept defeat and embrace a new political and economic order. The Bourbons, 
he said, were irredeemable; “[t]hey cannot be reconstructed,” for they were “still fighting the war 
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of secession—still struggling against the inevitable.”94 The South had lost the War. South 
Carolina’s leaders, unlike Georgia’s, failed to grasp this essential fact. Whereas Atlanta had 
remade itself, welcoming Northern investment, South Carolina languished. McLane made the case 
for a new approach, one that recognized and sympathized with the South’s terror and suffering in 
the War but sought to overcome it. 
At the conclusion of this call for “reconstruction” and “progress,” however, McLane 
endorsed—although tepidly—a staunchly white supremacist populist and a rising star in South 
Carolina politics: Benjamin R. Tillman. In 1886, Tillman, a fellow former Red-Shirt, seized on the 
growing resentment against the Democratic Party and organized the Farmer’s Movement, which 
sought to take over the party from the inside. He recognized that agrarian populism and white 
supremacy were a politically potent mix.95 In Feasterville, McLane offered his support to Tillman. 
“The members of this Grange since 1878 have been where Mr. B. R. Tillman of Edgefield now 
stands,” he said. “Therefore you can consistently indorse [sic] Mr. Tillman’s course; he is aiming 
for the same port for which years ago you set sail.”96 This was not exactly a rousing rallying cry 
behind Tillman’s cause, and the second-person pronouns distanced himself from the endorsement. 
Yet Tillman shared McLane’s anger at the ruling class and championed the ordinary farmer, 
though he himself was a wealthy planter.97 McLane’s cousin J. M. McCrorey disseminated the 
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Feasterville speech and wrote McLane’s brother comparing the two insurgents: “Tillman spoke 
here the first Monday,” he wrote from Abbeville. “[H]is speech was very much the same as 
Hendrix’s.” Tillman, McCrorey reported, “spoke at least half an hour about the lawers [sic].”98 
Perhaps, as Stephen Kantrowitz suggests, Tillman represented Republicans and Independents’ 
“only hope” to fracture the Democratic Party as it currently existed, even if Tillman never wavered 
in loyalty to the party.99 
As McCrorey spread word of the Feasterville speech in the summer of 1886, McLane 
prepared to leave politics and South Carolina. In early August, his good friend and Independent 
ally V. P. Clayton forwarded McLane a signed petition of members of Feasterville’s Universalist 
Church, expressing their willingness “to license brother J. Hendrix McLane to preach the gospel.” 
“Am glad you have determined to prosecute the work of lecturing people how to live that they may 
be prepared to die,” Clayton wrote his friend.100 Kantrowitz claims this was “self-imposed 
exile.”101 In November 1886, McLane received word that his application for a two-year, $360 
scholarship at Tufts College Divinity School was approved.102 The coursework included theology 
and homiletics—the study of preaching—in which one reading came from a speech of the 
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abolitionist Henry Ward Beecher.103 McLane, geographically and ideologically, was now far 
removed from his Southern upbringing. 
But whatever McLane gleaned from his religious education, it paled in comparison to the 
political opportunities that Tufts presented. McLane befriended E. H. Capen, the president of 
Tufts, who later recounted that “[l]ittle by little we learned the thrilling and almost tragic story of 
his work in South Carolina.” Capen eventually introduced his pupil to numerous political 
dignitaries in Boston, including a senator and two former governors.104 Capen was an “ardent 
Republican,” served as a party delegate to national conventions, and was a member of numerous 
Republican-leaning clubs and organizations in Boston.105 He shared, moreover, many of McLane’s 
political ideas. In a baccalaureate sermon he delivered in 1891, Capen celebrated the South’s 
improvements in education for “both whites and blacks” and declared that “[f]reedom, equality, 
enfranchisement are the watchwords of the hour.”106 Capen and McLane’s partnership embodies 
the New South vision of sectional comity. They shared a color-blind faith in progress, achieved 
through education and fair elections.107 
McLane did not end up taking a degree from Tufts.108 According to Herbert Seligmann, 
McLane’s son-in-law, the “family tradition,” as reported by McLane’s daughter, “was that 
[Hendrix] McLane had preached but one sermon, and decided the career of minister was not for 
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him.”109 Politics kept him busy, as did someone else. McLane’s archive contains no trace of 
evidence as to how, when, or why McLane met Fanny Clifford Friend. But on June 28, 1887, just 
eight months after arriving on “College Hill,” the 40-year-old widower married this New England 
woman at Boston Highlands in Roxbury.110 Friend, seven years McLane’s senior, was the daughter 
of an early female doctor and came from a family apparently connected to Henry C. Wright, the 
prominent Boston abolitionist, feminist, and pacifist.111 The former KKK firebrand’s marriage into 
a New England family with connections to radicals marked a personal triumph in achieving the 
cross-sectional, forward-looking alliance that he yearned to develop among South Carolinian 
farmers and Northern reform-minded Republicans.  
McLane worked feverishly to pursue this alliance. He fundraised to revive the Reform 
Signal, his old newspaper, and spoke at various clubs of Boston elites.112 The independent also 
made contact with George Washington Cable, a sharp critic of the South’s racism and the Jim 
Crow regime who was born in Louisiana and relocated to Massachusetts; Cable was too busy “to 
offer my cooperation.”113 The substance of McLane’s pitch to the Bostonians reflected his new 
audience. In the fundraising circular that Capen and six other elites distributed on McLane’s 
behalf, the only issue they identified was suffrage for all citizens, “both white and black.”114 No 
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longer speaking to the resentful upcountry farmers of South Carolina, McLane emphasized 
economic issues less and political rights more. 
McLane further sought to promote sectional unity by distancing his movement and his 
region from its Civil War history. To begin a series of ten newspaper essays published in the Boston 
Transcript in March 1888, McLane turned to 1861. “It is a mistake to suppose that the people of 
South Carolina seceded,” he wrote. Instead, a “little handful of lawyers,” who controlled the press, 
imposed secession on the masses. In this version of secession, ordinary South Carolinians “were 
forced out of the Union under gag law and against their honest protest.”115 The Independents, he 
endeavored to demonstrate, did not resent the Yankees. The South Carolinian flattered the North 
and appeared to bow to its superiority. Painting the Bourbons as lawless thugs, he quoted one letter 
from a fellow South Carolinian who made a trip to the North and returned impressed. “I am forced 
to the humiliating conclusion,” this visitor wrote McLane, “that they are a better people in many 
ways than we of the South.”116 McLane recognized that Northern support was essential to quashing 
the Bourbons and published a letter urging an alliance: “If the Independents of South Carolina can 
once get in affiliation with the good people of the North, […] our salvation would be sure.”117 The 
South needed the North for its “salvation.” As McLane made entreaties to forge a cross-sectional 
relationship between North and South to overthrow the Democrats, he sought to erase residual 
resentments from the War. 
McLane invoked the Civil War to spur the North to aid the South, illustrating the power of 
the War’s memory on politics through the late 1880s. In his final Transcript essay, McLane urged 
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Yankee readers to care about his state’s problems. He noted how many Northerners neglected the 
“Southern question,” taking solace that “[t]he war has been over twenty-three years.” McLane 
rebuked this “bad logic”: he disagreed that the War was over and all was resolved; instead, he 
urged the people of Massachusetts “to take as decided a stand against Bourbon brutality and fraud, 
in the election of today, as they did against slavery before the war.”118 McLane presented himself 
as a loyal Unionist struggling to defeat the old secessionist class. The conditions in the state 
impelled the North to intervene as it did in 1861. McLane concluded his Transcript series with a 
direct plea. “[I]f the people here will form an alliance with the Independents there and give us 
strong moral support,” he wrote, “[t]his mutual cooperation will be to the interest of the North and 
will assure the liberty and prosperity of South Carolina and of the whole South. Then, but not till 
then, will we have a united country.”119 McLane conceived his movement as an instrument of 
sectional unification. Unlike those who said that the War had been over for 23 years, he knew that 
the essence of the conflict endured. It would end when the “good people of the North” and the 
loyal masses of the South cooperated to unseat the manipulating, disloyal, power-hungry class 
responsible for the conflict in the first place. McLane’s war against the Bourbons would achieve 
what the Civil War did not: sectional unity. 
Yet even as he formulated a unifying, biracial movement, McLane never fully buried his 
own sectional and racial prejudices, indicating the limits of his new form of Southern politics. 
McLane worried that if he organized “an army of brave white and colored men” to defend their 
rights against Bourbon indiscretions, the Democrats would control the narrative in the press as it 
reached the North. “And would not the Northern people believe these lying despatches,” McLane 
asked, “and bring the whole force of your civilization down upon us?” The North, McLane 
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understood, still had the power to “defeat and destroy us.”120 He feared Yankee manipulation in 
Southern affairs, even as he wrote in a Boston newspaper soliciting funds. McLane continued to 
conceptualize politics with a sectional frame, employing the first-person “us” when referring to 
the South in contrast with the second-person “your” for the North. Anxieties about Northern 
domination, forged in the Reconstruction years, survived. In his home state, meanwhile, one 
newspaper sarcastically noted that “Mr. McLane is up in Boston getting on a little ‘culchur,’” 
mocking the North’s claim to sophistication and cultural superiority.121 Sectional barriers did not 
dissipate easily. 
Meanwhile, McLane’s political education continued. On May 28, 1888, Frederick 
Douglass, the former slave and abolitionist who was now a Republican activist, spoke in Tremont 
Temple in Boston on the subject of women’s rights. McLane and his wife were in the audience.122 
One wonders what McLane might have been thinking as he heard one of the most famous speakers 
in America. The two had backgrounds and prospects as divergent as one could imagine: Douglass 
was a former slave who became a party insider and one of the most prominent men of the century; 
McLane was a former member of the KKK who was struggling to form a viable political coalition 
and destined for obscurity. But both men, at that point, were Republicans, and both grappled deeply 
with the legacy of the Civil War, 23 years after its apparent end. They grasped that politics still 
revolved around the meaning of that bloody conflict.  
McLane’s time in Boston tested the limits of the War’s legacy. In the heart of New England, 
the South Carolinian worked to unify the sections and races under the Independent banner. The 
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final months of 1888 signaled a turning point in McLane’s circuitous life. With the victory of 
Benjamin Harrison, a Republican, in the presidential election, McLane had new opportunities to 
press for reform and a revived, reformed Republican Party in South Carolina; he went to 
Indianapolis to see the president-elect on November 22, 1888.123 Meanwhile, Fanny gave birth to 
a son, Allen Friend McLane, on December 14.124 Having remade his personal life and garnered 
new allies in the unlikeliest of places, the new father turned his attention back to his home state, 
seeking again to regenerate a political revolution. 
 
V. The South More Surely Solid: Returning Home, 1889–94 
MAY OF 1892 WAS A BUSY MONTH FOR MCLANE. He spent time in Greenville, Wagener, 
and Columbia, South Carolina. He travelled to Philadelphia and New York and made two trips to 
Boston. On the final day of the month, he began a journey to Minneapolis. He kept a simple diary, 
logging his location each day. But when he reached Chicago on June 1, he reflected for a moment: 
“This,” he wrote, “is my first sight of Canada.”125 Surely McLane must have marveled at the 
trajectory of his life. His unlikely political career had taken him across the country. The yeoman 
son of a slaveholding family was now en route to the Republican National Convention, prepared 
to plead his case for recognition from the party that he once reviled. The trip culminated more than 
four itinerant years of intense organization. His appearance in Minneapolis marked the apex of his 
hopes for the new, independent-minded branch of the Republican Party he sought to build in South 
Carolina. He returned home with those hopes shattered. In the final years of his life, an embittered 
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McLane reckoned with the impenetrability of the racial, sectional, and historical boundaries that 
he had travelled so many miles and spent so many years trying to transcend. 
McLane’s next movement, the “reform Republican” Party, was his latest attempt to 
overcome the racial divide, but its proposed solution failed to win the trust of either race. McLane 
and a South Carolina ally organized a convention in February 1889 in Pickens to organize the new 
party.126 There, the independents spoke explicitly on behalf of “native white citizens” and framed 
the party as an attempt to transcend the state’s racially divided history: “we wish to forever put to 
rest the joint falsehood of the Bourbons and carpet baggers that all native white people in South 
Carolina are Democrats” and that “all the colored people are Republicans.”127  
McLane’s new party sought to reject the segregated alignment forged in Reconstruction. 
A “true interracial alliance,” Stephen Kantrowitz argues, would be even more radical; it would 
require “southern white men to surrender their own monopoly on power.”128 This the Pickens 
convention was unwilling to do; it installed whites as the sole leaders of the party. In doing so, it 
paralleled other Southern interracial reform movements, including the Readjusters.129 That 
McLane courted an interracial coalition at all is remarkable given his background. But his limited 
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message did not always thrill black people. When L. Edwin Dudley, a contact of McLane in 
Boston, visited South Carolina at the behest of Massachusetts Representative Henry Cabot Lodge 
and Senator George Hoar, he reiterated the need for a white-led party in order to divide the white 
vote. Black Republicans recoiled: “This picture of a back seat in the peanut gallery as lookers on 
at the performance, while the chief parts on the stage were taken by white men who but lately had 
been fiercely opposing them,” one article commented, “did not strike favorably the majority of the 
colored auditors of Mr. Dudley last night.” Even those who were open to Dudley’s proposed 
“experiment” expressed their distaste for McLane, whom one black attendee called a “crank.”130 
At numerous local meetings, groups of black Republicans denounced McLane and his new 
organization.131 Understandably, they questioned the prudence of trading away their access to 
Republican patronage for an explicitly reduced role in a new, unproven party—especially when 
its leaders were all former Democrats and Redeemers. The interracial possibilities of Southern 
dissent remained precarious. 
Benjamin Tillman did not help with easing racial tensions; the agrarian firebrand whom 
McLane endorsed in 1886 won the Democrats’ gubernatorial nomination in 1890, further 
fracturing the Bourbons’ opponents. Tillman’s campaign for an agricultural college channeled the 
zeitgeist in the country: the farmers were suffering and angry.132 But Tillman’s flagrant racial 
appeal turned the Republican organization away from him, indicating the tension between 
economic populism and racially inclusive politics that McLane attempted to straddle. Tillman drew 
on the legacy of 1876 to define his political identity, not as a reformer but as a murderer of 
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blacks.133 Unable to run a nominee of their own, Regular Republican leaders declared their 
intention to “exercise their right to vote for any good men irrespective of party lines and defeat 
Tillman, whom they regard as a bitter enemy of the negro race.”134 The Regulars decided to “unite 
with the straightouts,” the more genteel Democratic faction that nominated a challenger to Tillman. 
McLane’s group of Republicans, meanwhile, nominated a candidate and defined itself as 
“essentially conservative”—implicitly in contrast to the “revolutionary” Tillman—but that 
candidate never appeared on the ballot in 1890; Tillman coasted to victory.135 A fiery champion of 
the farmers had successfully taken hold of the conservative Democratic state and mounted a proto-
populist revolution. But unlike McLane, this successful dissenter never betrayed the Democratic 
Party, the white race, or the history that tied them together. 
Even before this electoral disappointment, McLane had his sights set on a larger goal; with 
energy bordering on fanaticism, he continued to organize his white-led Republican faction, 
forming a new party he hoped would achieve national recognition. In April 1890, he attended the 
Republican Club Convention in Nashville and was elected a member of the National League 
Committee from South Carolina.136 He allied his movement with the National Republican League, 
an offshoot Republican organization that began in 1881 that emphasized civil-service reform and 
honest governance.137 A decade later, McLane organized a convention to establish a League branch 
in South Carolina. “The true object of this league now is to rid the people of the dregs of this old 
line party of carpet baggers,” McLane told a reporter, “and to create a confidence between North 
and South by not making a question of race or color, but by selecting the best men for the 
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offices.”138 By cleansing the party of its Reconstruction past and suppressing the race question, the 
Reformers would ingratiate themselves with the Northern power brokers and gain the benefit of 
national resources and support. 
McLane put this theory to the test when he addressed the Republican National Convention 
in 1892. He urged the convention to seat his Reform Republican delegation rather than the Regular 
faction.139 McLane’s speech was a tribute to his brand of interracial, cross-sectional dissent, a 
grandly optimistic synthesis of the vision that directed him for the last 14 years. He presented the 
Independents as the true friends of black Republicans: the Regular faction “falsely claim[ed] to 
bear” affection “for the poor down trodden Negro.” McLane reported that his party sympathized 
with the plight of African Americans and earned their support. “Both races of our people,” he 
declared, “are ready for the formation of a clean and respectable Republican party. A large number 
of progressive [and] aggressive whites are coming into our movement where they meet [and] 
readily assimilate with the better class of thoughtful colored people.”140 The Reform Republicans, 
McLane suggested, had shattered the color line—even though his party, as shown, was hardly 
egalitarian. 
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McLane proclaimed that his band of dissenters had triumphed over historical and sectional 
barriers. He proudly noted that the delegation in Minneapolis included “some of the best white and 
colored men in the State—white men belonging to the best native families, [and] some northern 
men, who were in the Union army.”141 In repeating the qualifier “best,” McLane vaguely asserted 
that his party was purer than the Regular Republicans, perhaps distancing his coalition from the 
corruption associated with Reconstruction. Among his group were seven ex-Confederates, three 
ex-Union soldiers, and at least two black men, a professor and a reverend.142 The coalition 
dissolved divisions of the past. “The movement,” McLane said, “is therefore, free from race 
prejudices [and] sectional feelings.”143 Absent from his rhetoric was any allusion to the violence 
he and his men continued to face, the racialized opposition from the press, or his own experience 
as a Redeemer in 1876. McLane concluded with a final, dramatic flourish. Accepting the Reform 
Republicans’ “appeal,” he said, “will be the opening of a wide door to the ingress of Republicanism 
in the whole South. It will be a new emancipation of the colored men, the establishment of equality 
of interest, influence [and] action between the two races [and] the vindication of honor [and] 
honesty of the national Republican party.”144 Perhaps no other sentence better captures McLane’s 
vision at its most optimistic and radical: the Reformers would not just foster an interracial party, 
but they would establish genuine equality between the races. After years of resisting the lure of 
the past, McLane invoked “emancipation,” the most dramatic result of the Civil War. Far from 
rejecting the basic premise of Reconstruction, he promised to fulfill its unfinished work—to 
furnish “a new emancipation.”  
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Yet four months later, McLane was not even a Republican. In perhaps the most resounding 
blow to his political career, the Minnesota convention voted to seat those whom McLane called 
“old ‘hacks’”: delegates of the Regular Republican Party.145 In October 1892, he attended a rally 
of the People’s Party in Boston. “I was delighted,” McLane wrote in an uncharacteristically long 
and reflective diary entry, “[and] felt more at home in this meeting than any I have attended for 
years.” “I have been a strong believer since 1879 in the same things advocated at this meeting,” he 
continued. “And I advocated them at the risk of my life in S.C. as far back as 1879–80 + 82.”146 
Populism emerged in the West as an agrarian movement, rooted in the same economic appeals of 
McLane’s 1879 “Labor and Finance” speech.147 McLane had lost faith in the Republican Party, 
which had increasingly become the party of big business, directly opposed to the interests of 
labor.148 He was resigned that it “cannot do much for the toiling masses in regard to wages or to 
relieve their debt distressed condition. Nor can the party secure a free [and] honest ballot in the 
South.”149 In South Carolina, though, the Populists struggled to make inroads. Tillman coopted 
white agrarian anger, and the state’s majority-black demographic composition continued to deter 
whites from joining third-party movements, as they feared inadvertently helping the 
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Republicans.150 Nevertheless, McLane, fed up with the Republicans, “rejoiced” at the election of 
Grover Cleveland, the Democrat whom he had repeatedly criticized in his newspaper in 1884.151 
The South Carolinian insurgent was as mercurial as ever. 
By late 1892, these ironies wore down his optimistic spirit and exposed a sharper, more 
resigned figure of dissent. At some point after his Minneapolis disappointment, McLane wrote a 
lengthy essay, undated, that survives only in handwritten form and serves as a bookend to his 
convention speech. In the second essay, he demonstrated the enduring power of race, section, and 
history to threaten and ultimately defeat the vision he outlined in Minneapolis. He chastised the 
“Northern radical with the help of the unscrupulous carpetbagger” for forcing “the negro question 
to the front,” enabling the Southern Bourbons to survive.152 McLane’s arguments on race reiterated 
his earlier belief that an interracial coalition would have to be limited in its racial unity, tempered 
by a firm commitment to white leadership. He specifically criticized the Harrison Administration’s 
patronage decisions, by which the new president removed “native white men” appointed by 
Cleveland and replaced them with “negroes.”153 During the Cleveland years, he reported, “the race 
feeling greatly subsided, [and] before two years ago had passed away, the white people were more 
national than they had been since 1861.” With white men holding power, he said, racial tensions 
diminished. Counterintuitively, though, he argued, this was better for the black man: “the scope of 
his freedom was more extensive than he had ever known before.” Being “at peace” with whites, 
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McLane contended, “was the first thing necessary towards the political emancipation of both 
[races].”154 The “new emancipation” that McLane envisioned in Minneapolis was a system of 
white paternalism. McLane’s affirmation that “reviv[ing] the negro question” backfired for the 
Republicans indicates the extent to which the “negro question” had never been buried.  
As McLane’s essay makes clear, it was not simply racism that triumphed during the 
Harrison years, but a racialized view of history. In addition to appointing Regular Republican 
blacks, the Harrison Administration also pursued the Federal Elections Bill, referred to 
pejoratively in the South as the “Force Bill.” The legislation would have authorized federal circuit 
courts to appoint supervisors of elections, and it was written with the intent of ensuring the ability 
of black men to vote in the South. Its author was Representative Henry Cabot Lodge and its Senate 
sponsor was George Hoar—the two Massachusetts Republicans who dispatched Edwin Dudley in 
1889 to South Carolina to inquire into the strength of McLane’s Reform Republican movement.155 
The bill championed the South Carolinian’s most consistent political priority from 1882 on: 
election fairness. Now, however, McLane rejected their proposal. Harrison’s “appointments, 
coupled with the Force bill legislation,” McLane argued, could not “have any other tendency than 
to resurrect the fear of negro domination [and] help to make the South more surely solid, [and] 
thus prolong Bourbon domination in the Southern states.”156 A federal effort to protect the right of 
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black male voters would revive the specter of “negro domination,” racist code for Reconstruction. 
Legislation to prevent the Democratic regime from intimidating voters and engaging in election 
fraud—the very tools that McLane believed allowed the Bourbons to win elections in the first 
place—would now stir memories of the past and further entrench the Bourbons. McLane appeared 
to concede his entire philosophy on elections to fears of increasing the threat of Reconstruction-
era “negro domination.” His personal “transformation” toward this fatalistic attitude, Stephen 
Kantrowitz writes, marked Tillman’s ultimate triumph over the populists and “yet another defining 
moment in the reconstruction of white supremacy.”157 What kept the South “solid” was the fear 
and memory of the original Reconstruction. 
 In the Southern psyche, even deeper than the memory of Reconstruction was the memory 
of the Civil War—and McLane’s final appeal resurrected the animosity and political relevance of 
the War. McLane suggested that the Minneapolis convention’s refusal to recognize his delegation 
was evidence that “they have entirely forgotten what it cost the North [and] Nation to deal with 
this Southern problem from 61 to 65.”158 In snuffing out McLane’s upstart reformers, the Northern 
Republicans aggravated the same “Southern problem” that created so much destruction during the 
War. With a militant tone, he reminded the North of the South’s fighting power of three decades 
earlier and denounced the North’s attempt to impose itself on the South via the Regular 
Republicans, who constituted a handful of white allies and the “helpless race of colored people.” 
The memory of the War revealed the full force of McLane’s racial paternalism and interwove 
racial and sectional tensions. While his bitterness may have been motivated in part by his personal 
rejection at Minneapolis, McLane also reflected the worldview of most white Southerners, 
including those who had long opposed him. The years “61 to 65” unified them all.  
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 Nearing his conclusion, McLane outlined a plan for renewing the South that was greatly 
constrained by the memory of the War. “The Southern problem,” he avowed, “must be settled on 
Southern soil, [and] largely through the enduring patriotic activity of the progressive element of 
Southern whites.”159 To redeem the South, blacks and Northerners had to play subordinate roles. 
He urged the North to “encourage reliable reformers in the South,” but to deal with the South “on 
their own ground and from a Southern standpoint. They [Southerners] cannot be coerced into 
taking on Northern life [and] habits by the threat of force bills, through a revengeful use of the 
Federal patronage, or by the […] Northern demagogue [and] press.”160 Reconciliation between the 
sections depended on the North yielding to the Southern viewpoint with absolute deference.161 
States’ rights would prevail. If the North met “the progressive spirit in the South with a like spirit 
on a patriotic basis,” McLane promised, “the chasm will soon be bridged.”162  
Though still proposing a “progressive” vision, McLane implicitly acknowledged that the 
“chasm” of the Civil War endured. Any attempt to break up the solid South that revived the 
sectional and racial hatreds of the War was destined to fail. The “new emancipation” that McLane 
promised gave way to unreconciled hostility over the conflict that created the original 
emancipation.  
 
VI. Conclusion: A Piercing Light of Prophecy 
AS MCLANE WAGED A POLITICAL BATTLE OVER THE CIVIL WAR, he waged a private battle 
with his own body. He struggled on and off with “throat trouble” from at least September 1891 
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and died of tuberculosis on August 14, 1894 at 46, attracting little public notice.163 The prospects 
of his movement withered, too; by 1895, Jim Crow reigned in South Carolina, and blacks were 
formally disfranchised.164 Eighteen black people were lynched during Benjamin Tillman’s four-
year tenure as governor. The legislature rewarded him by electing him to the United States 
Senate.165    
Tillman is now memorialized in front of the South Carolina State House. By contrast, 
McLane would have vanished from historical consciousness if not for his daughter, who likely had 
no living memories of him. Lillias Hazewell MacLane—she spelled her name with an additional 
“a”—was born 13 months before her father died.166 She collected papers that her parents left 
behind: diaries, newspaper clippings, letters, and scrapbooks. The material intrigued her husband, 
Herbert Seligmann, a white Jewish man who worked for the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People for 13 years. Seligmann later became a journalist, and when 
Lillias died, he wrote a lengthy article about his father-in-law in 1965. He donated a copy of his 
essay, his research notes, and his wife’s collection to Yale University, all of which was valued at 
$150.167 
 In death, then, McLane transcended the racial, sectional, and historical boundaries that he 
tried to span, personally as well as politically, in life. In Seligmann’s romanticized portrait, 
McLane was a courageous, solitary hero who sought to reform the South from the inside. “He saw 
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that much of the South refused to accept the fact of defeat in the Civil War,” Seligmann wrote, the 
full meaning of which was “not only that slavery must end, but that the slavery attitudes based on 
exploitation of colored by white people were incompatible with the basic concepts of a democratic 
society.”168 Seligmann presented his father-in-law as the South’s redeemer from its history and as 
a champion of racial equality, a man who stood up to all that was backwards in the American 
tradition. Seligmann’s McLane was a liberal prophet of the Civil War. 
 
 Seligmann hailed McLane’s independent politics as a precursor to the civil rights 
movement, with which he sympathized. “This man’s thoughts, utterances, and, more important, 
his actions throw a piercing light of prophecy on the struggle now, 1965, still in process. We are 
still,” he wrote, “as a nation, not free of the South’s heritage of resentment at defeat.” 
“Bourbonism,” he concluded, “in protean forms, is still with us, and the fight [McLane] fought is 
still, and will remain for long years, to be carried forward.”169 Civil rights leaders, Seligmann 
hoped, would fulfill McLane’s reform vision. 
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 Seligmann’s analysis captured the War’s integral presence in McLane’s politics, but it was 
incomplete and misleading. Over the course of his political life, McLane certainly tried to 
overcome “the South’s heritage of resentment at defeat,” but he also harbored that resentment 
himself. He modeled his political movements, in organization and rhetoric, off of Redemption, 
which sought to defeat Reconstruction. He was hardly a champion of racial equality, and though 
he courted black supporters, he did not grant them equal status. He recognized the constraints that 
the Civil War memory created, racially and regionally, but he could not escape them. Swirling 
inside him was what Carl Degler called a “triple history”: he and his colleagues were shaped by 
the national narrative of the United States; the regional identity of Southerners; and the unique set 
of values of Southern dissidents.170 His political volatility embodied the difficulty—if not 
impossibility—of streamlining these clashing historical orientations into a coherent, politically 
viable narrative.  
 That Seligmann felt that McLane’s story was so relevant to the 1960s further illustrates the 
grip that the War exerted over Southern politics. Historical memory sympathetic to the 
Confederacy and white supremacy has survived the attempts of McLane, Seligmann, and many 
more reformers to inaugurate a political and social revolution in the South rooted in an alternative 
reading of the War’s history and meaning. Four years before Seligmann wrote his essay, South 
Carolina raised the Confederate Battle Flag in 1961 above its State House to commemorate the 
Civil War centennial. The state symbolically affirmed what McLane and his contemporaries 
implicitly understood: the Civil War did not end in 1865. It was not—is not—over. 
• 
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 Historians will never be able to recreate the thoughts that coursed through McLane’s head 
while he waited inside Winnsboro’s hotel as Red-Shirts jostled at the door. He remains a largely 
inscrutable figure, having maintained skeletal diaries and left behind relatively few written records. 
His legacy lies not in what he did, but what he did not do. Counterfactuals and hypotheticals are 
not the primary domain of historians, but the blurred shadows of McLane’s failures help illuminate 
the ways South Carolinians entrenched white supremacy. He further serves as a reminder that such 
shadows existed. Even when the South was most “solid,” figures like McLane risked their lives to 
imagine something different. 
 In retrospect, the scene at Winnsboro—swarming Red-Shirts, angry shouts, drunken 
kicks—appears as a crystallization of a battle between competing populisms. McLane, if he were 
allowed to speak, would have advanced a vision of economic redistribution. If yeomen farmers 
and ordinary laborers were empowered and protected, racial and sectional distinctions would melt 
away. The Red-Shirts, however, promoted a populism animated by racialized notions of white 
male power, channeling their resentments against poor blacks and their perceived allies, such as 
McLane.171 In South Carolina, and across the region, that vision triumphed; the historiographical 
consensus is that racism subsumed and eventually destroyed populism at the turn of the twentieth 
century.172 In many ways, American politics continues to revolve around this battle of populisms. 
The question of whether populism can ever be free of white supremacy—whether race is doomed 
to hijack and coopt class-based appeals—remains a matter of contemporary debate. 
 The story of J. Hendrix McLane offers no answers. But it illustrates that such debates are 
never purely ideological. Politics belongs to the realm of emotions, memories, and stories as much 
as it reflects facts, policies, and rational arguments. Fights of the present are often fights about the 
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past—and shaped by them. It was not simply racism that defeated McLane. As he sat in the hotel 
with his daughter, silenced and trapped by the mob, he was a prisoner of history.  
 
 
 
 
Words: 12,437.  
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Bibliographic Essay 
I found Hendrix McLane on an early September afternoon, scrolling through listings of 
Yale’s archival collections relating to the Civil War and Reconstruction. I have gravitated to this 
period throughout the whole of my college tenure. In the turmoil of the War and in the country’s 
reckoning with the institution of slavery and the meaning of freedom, I heard echoes of our current 
roiling times. Reconstruction captures the country at its best and at its worst, illustrating its greatest 
possibilities and its ugliest limitations. My coursework ingrained in me that no history, and 
certainly not Reconstruction, could be encapsulated by a single narrative; the battle over the stories 
we tell about the War and Reconstruction continues to define our politics and our national self-
identity. I knew nothing about this unorthodox figure with an imperious name—John Augustus 
Hendrix McLane—but I was drawn to his apparent engagement with the legacy of the Civil War 
in the deep South. I believed that his was an untold story of Reconstruction. At the outset, I did 
not know the question I would be answering. But in learning his story, I hoped, I could join and 
perhaps add to the ongoing dialogue about Reconstruction and its defeat. I embarked on an attempt 
to find Hendrix McLane, which taught me as much about the tortuous nature of historical research 
as it did about McLane himself.  
I began with a simple online search, and I found what continues to be one of the only 
published scholarly works on my elusive subject: Stephen Kantrowitz’s August 2000 article, “Ben 
Tillman and Hendrix McLane, Agrarian Rebels: White Manhood, ‘The Farmers,’ and the Limits 
of Southern Populism.” Kantrowitz introduced me to the central motifs that defined my project: 
the possibilities of cultivating an interracial political coalition deep in the post-Reconstruction 
South; the dueling impulses of economic and racial self-interest; the emergence of agrarian 
populism; the hulking presence of Benjamin Tillman in South Carolina politics; and the 
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complicated legacy of the Civil War and Reconstruction entangling all of the above. Kantrowitz 
pursued similar ideas in his biography of Tillman of the same year, Ben Tillman and the 
Reconstruction of White Supremacy.  
Having located little other secondary material on McLane, I proceeded to the archive to 
discover McLane myself. To the extent I ever found him, he emerged slowly and incompletely out 
of the slim two boxes of his papers at Sterling Memorial Library’s Manuscripts and Archives. The 
papers encompassed a mix of speeches, pamphlets, letters, political records, newspaper clippings, 
scrapbooks, and exasperatingly curt diaries. Working through the material, I came to unearth the 
feverish activities of a man constantly at odds with the prevailing political dogma, constantly 
organizing a new movement or party, constantly on the move. Confronted with the multiplicity of 
political identities he assumed, I struggled to identify coherent threads with which to weave my 
story. I agreed with the diagnosis of my advisor, Professor David Blight: McLane was “mercurial.”  
Secondary sources helped considerably to contextualize McLane’s career. Carl Degler’s 
The Other South chronicled the development of dissenters and independents in the South from the 
Civil War through the Populist moment. Degler established, in the most basic sense, that there 
was, indeed, an “Other South,” an alternative strain of thought that resisted the dominant political 
currents since before the outbreak of the Civil War. McLane did not appear, but he firmly belonged 
to this tradition. Degler chronicled the more famous Southern dissenters, such as William Mahone 
and the Readjusters of Virginia, and their examples began to clarify what sorts of arguments and 
forms of opposition were popular—and what were possible. Degler’s conclusion on the triumph 
of “race allegiance” over “class appeals” in the South, which marred, if not destroyed, the reform 
impulses of Southerners, became an influential framework for my analysis. Ed Ayers’s The 
Promise of the New South presented a social and cultural portrait of the “New South” and offered 
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details on the political and economic issues, such as the “stock law” and “eight-box law,” that 
animated McLane. A study of interracial dissent in North Carolina, Deborah Beckel’s Radical 
Reform, helped provide me a sense of a more successful populist revolt in the South. 
Most of the secondary works I consulted on Southern post-Reconstruction politics included 
almost no information on South Carolina. Independent and reform movements achieved varying 
levels of success across the South, but they barely registered a blip in the election returns in the 
Palmetto State; accordingly, McLane and his colleagues received almost no mention in the survey 
works. Perhaps for that very reason, I found McLane’s story all the more compelling. His failures 
would illuminate the possibilities and limits of class-based opposition and interracial organization 
in the most unfriendly political terrain. I therefore began to focus on South Carolina more 
narrowly. A call to the South Carolina Historical Society ultimately yielded the second—and, to 
my knowledge, only the second—journal article about McLane. Brookes Miles Barnes’s 
“Southern Independents, South Carolina, 1882” offered helpful portraits not only on McLane, but 
on his ragtag group of independents on the ballot in 1882. Barnes’s work helped identify new 
avenues for primary-source research, highlighting newspaper troves on the 1882 campaign. For 
similar reasons, I turned to William J. Cooper Jr.’s 1968 study of South Carolina politics, The 
Conservative Regime: South Carolina, 1877–1890, in which McLane briefly appears. Cooper 
provided pertinent details on the landscape of South Carolina politics. 
With a more refined sense of the issues and personalities involved, I returned to McLane’s 
papers and other primary sources. As I scoured McLane’s archive, new questions emerged. Part 
of the collection is the research notes and article compiled by McLane’s son-in-law Herbert J. 
Seligmann, a former NAACP employee and journalist, who ultimately donated the papers to Yale. 
Seligmann’s progressive gloss on McLane’s life was intriguing, though less and less credible the 
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more I learned. I sought more information on the McLane family. I visited the New York Public 
Library to view Seligmann’s papers, and the archivist there also pointed me to the papers of Julia 
M. Wass Carpenter, McLane’s mother-in-law. While the New York papers did not unveil 
substantial new information, they enhanced my portrait of McLane’s family and his activism in 
Boston. I found half a dozen of McLane’s calling cards in her archive, which may just have 
represented his courtship of Carpenter’s daughter, Fanny, who became his wife. In turn, my 
interest in McLane’s years at Tufts Divinity School and his relationships with Boston elites led me 
to the archives at the Tisch Library of Tufts University. I looked through the archive of Elmer H. 
Capen, the president of Tufts who became a friend and patron of McLane. Though McLane, alas, 
did not appear in Capen’s papers, I gained a more complete sense of the elite Republican circles 
in which Capen, and through him, McLane, travelled. Born and bred a Southerner, McLane seemed 
to be much better received by Yankees. 
Newspaper sources complemented my archival work and closed many gaps in the record. 
The digital newspaper database of the South Caroliniana Library offered a highly useful search 
function of local papers, allowing me to identify numerous articles about McLane’s otherwise 
undetectable newspaper, the Reform Signal, and to gain a much clearer sense of where McLane 
was at any given time, what he said, and how he was received. The newspapers also illuminated 
the battles over patronage during the Harrison Administration between McLane’s independent or 
“Reform” Republican group and what was left of the “Regular” Republicans. The database 
America’s Historical Newspapers proved equally fruitful, turning up a full run of the most 
prominent South Carolina newspaper, the Charleston News and Courier, as well as many of the 
Boston newspapers in which McLane appeared when he moved North. The digital archive of the 
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New York Times added additional newspaper sources to my collection, highlighting the moments 
and issues in McLane’s life that attracted national attention.   
My dialectical process between primary and secondary sources continued, as I turned back 
to secondary authors to help refine my argument. For studies of Populism and the South’s 
complicated role in the movement, I consulted Lawrence Goodwyn’s The Populist Moment and 
Robert McMath Jr.’s American Populism. For an overview of the Republican Party during the 
Gilded Age, Heather Cox Richardson’s To Make Men Free was helpful, especially in elucidating 
the party’s changing approach to the South under Benjamin Harrison. In Stories of the South, K. 
Stephen Prince offered a compelling interpretation of the “New South” as a rhetorical and 
symbolic notion as much as an economic reality. C. Vann Woodward’s landmark work on the 
topic, The Origins of the New South, is rightly seen as one of the founding works of “Southern 
History,” and the book, first published in 1951, remained fresh. I referred to Gretchen Ritter’s 
Goldbugs and Greenbacks for material on the Greenback Party and to John Sproat’s “The Best 
Men” for a better understanding of the Liberal Republicans, a model for McLane’s Reform 
Republicans. For additional context on the South in the Gilded Age, I used Richard White’s 
comprehensive The Republic For Which It Stands. Eric Foner’s Short History of Reconstruction, 
which I first encountered in a lecture course on the Civil War in my first year at Yale, remained 
valuable for background on Reconstruction. As a reference for South Carolina newspapers, John 
Hammond Moore’s South Carolina’s Newspapers was a thorough catalogue.  
Finally, thanks to the generosity of Grace Hopper College’s Mellon Grant and the Yale 
History Department, I was able to pay a visit to McLane’s adopted home state of South Carolina. 
Over two-and-a-half days of research in February, I spent time in the South Caroliniana Library at 
the University of South Carolina, the South Carolina Department of Archives and History, and the 
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Fairfield County Museum. While many of my findings did not make it directly into my thesis, they 
helped me better understand McLane’s allies and opponents. At the South Caroliniana Library, I 
thumbed through archives of Simeon Corley, a former Reconstruction-era Republican 
congressman in South Carolina and a friend and supporter of McLane; Hugh Thompson, McLane’s 
gubernatorial opponent in 1882; Ben Tillman; Farmers’ Alliance groups; and agrarian activists. At 
the Fairfield County Museum, I gained more information on McLane’s family and got to see the 
small town that became his home.  
Back at Yale, perhaps my most startling discovery of all was that one of my current 
professors, William I. Garfinkel, now a federal judge, wrote a term paper for a Yale history seminar 
in 1975 on none other than McLane. Judge Garfinkel located his paper, which arose out of the very 
same archive that I consulted; it served as a useful analysis with which to compare my own. This 
coincidence affirmed to me the ways history, even the most obscure history, is far from a study of 
things old and dead. It is a poignantly human discipline. In the connections I formed in this process, 
from New Haven to New York, Medford to Columbia, J. Hendrix McLane animated and enriched 
my life for the better part of seven months. In telling his story, he became a part of mine. 
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